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1. Introduction 
 
The recent advances in mobile technologies have brought about increased functionality, 
however this increased functionality in turn increases the vulnerability of mobile 
networks, services and users.  In such an environment supplying secure mobile services 
requires a high degree of coordination among a variety of industry players including 
equipment manufacturers, application developers, operating system developers and 
service providers.  The scale of the challenge can be assessed by merely observing the 
difficulties faced by administrators of fixed organizational networks in their attempts to 
maintain virus-free networks in a context where the end users are to some degree under 
their control. In this light it is easy to imagine that providing secure services to end users 
in a highly decentralized public mobile network environment will certainly be a 
challenge. The complexity such services entail raises questions about whether or not 
service providers will be able to deliver and even more challenging offer security quality 
of service guarantees. 
 
Whether or not secure mobile services will be offered is a function of both supply and 
demand.  While certain measures can be taken to assist the traditional market 
mechanisms that face challenges when high degrees of coordination are required there 
may also be a role for public policy.  As both a component of critical infrastructures and 
as a licensed use of the public spectrum with public interest obligations, there may be a 
basis for public policy mechanisms to be employed to facilitate the supply of such 
services. 
 
In this paper we address these issues by first exploring factors affecting the supply and 
demand of security technologies and services.  This is followed by a review of the policy 
context and recent developments in the U.S. and Europe.  Information from these 
synopses are then combined with findings from our companion report “The Delft UMTS 
Testbed and End-user Security Features” to suggest a research agenda that if 
implemented will answer fundamental questions concerning the future of end-user mobile 
security.   
 
2. Mobile security supply and demand 
 
Security is researched from a variety of perspectives and is often considered a sub-field 
of information assurance (see Kabara 2002).  When limited to the mobile real the 
perspective may be defined by the level of the network architecture.  For example, 
security may be treated at the level of the public mobile network infrastructure, or 
alternatively at the level of the applications running on that network, or of the 
applications running on a mobile device.  Here we are interested in mobile end-user 
security, which differs from broader conceptualizations of security in several important 
ways.  From the end-user’s perspective security is primarily concerned with safeguarding 
the handset from loss or theft, safeguarding the account from unauthorized charges and 
safeguarding locally and centrally stored data.  End-user security and broader security 
concerns intersect in a variety of ways, such as the implications of an overall network 
outage on centrally stored user data, however the end-user perspective leads to different 
conceptualizations of security problems and their solutions.  
 
The current discourse on security tends to focus on public switched and organizational 
networks as this level of analysis has implications for a large numbers of users.   This is 
true in both fixed network and mobile network security.  However, as the number of 
personal-use mobile Internet subscribers grows end-user perspectives are likely to be of 
greater concern. 
 
Current security problems can be analyzed from both a supply and demand perspective. 
The supply of secure mobile services requires two distinct parts.  First there must an 
adequate supply of security-enabled software and hardware.  Second, and perhaps more 
important, is the successful management of these assets.  Currently the mobile market 
faces challenges in both domains (Pethia 2003).   
 
The supply of secure network-level hardware and software has benefited from the recent 
attention to critical infrastructures.  Although much of the critical infrastructures work 
focuses on fixed networks, mobile is increasingly seen as an important component in the 
overall communications infrastructure.  This fixed network orientation has also spilled 
over to the organizational level where network administrators are struggling to keep their 
corporate information systems virus-free.  However, like the critical infrastructures 
dialog, considerations of organizational network security are now also bringing mobile 
devices and applications into the picture. 
 
Challenges of integrating a secure mobile computing environment into an organization 
include the increasingly decentralized nature of network management.  Organizations 
have managed mobile devices such as laptops by establishing virtual private networks 
(VPNs) and these now must be extended to include a wider range of mobile devices each 
with their own physical characteristics (access mode, size, etc.) Furthermore, mobile 
security must take into account the diversity of public mobile networks (CDMA, GSM, 
TDMA) and the small size, power levels and capacity of some mobile terminals, as well 
as different use patterns.  While laptop use may have evolved in such a way as to remain 
predominantly for business use, mobile phones even when supplied by the organization 
are often used for both personal and business use. Within this overall decentralized 
administrative environment the management of mobile devices will require a centralized 
and automated approach.    In an organizational deployment network managers must 
consider both the initial deployment as well as ways to manage automated updates 
(Nokia 2002). 
 
The supply of products such as mobile VPN software for organizational use faces several 
challenges, one of which is time to market pressure.  Even when the software has an 
ostensible orientation toward security such as VPN software time to market pressures can 
create pressures that limit the level of robustness of the security solution.  An even larger 
problem is with software that serves another purpose yet has an inherent security 
component (web browsers, email) (Pethia 2003). 
 
Intricately connected to problems of mobile security supply is demand for these products 
and services.  At the organizational level, while network administrators may be crying for 
increased security from vendors when it comes time to make the required trade-offs other 
factors such as interoperability and standardization usually win.  The desire for 
interoperability and standardization not only competes directly against security features 
embedded in software but leads to networks that lack diversity and can lead to 
catastrophic failures (Hernan 2000). 
 
Thus, even among network administrators the issue of security may not be a top priority 
vis-à-vis performance.  Not surprisingly, the situation is likely worse among the highly 
distributed private network users who lack knowledge about the importance of security or 
lack the skills to operate their own systems securely. 
 
Recommendations for overcoming the problems of security supply include matching the 
attention paid to ease-of-use in design with one of ease-of-secure administration.  Such a 
shift requires greater training in security issues by engineers and software developers.  
However, the greatest changes in supply will occur when demand changes.  One way to 
affect demand is for organizations to pay greater attention to patching and updating 
existing software, a reflection of an increased emphasis on security at the organizational 
level.  Furthermore, if software and hardware are designed such that security features are 
easy to manage even the armies of under-informed users will be able to handle these and 
thus demand will follow (Pethia 2003).  
 
While the discussions of supply and demand of secure applications and services most 
often assumes a fixed network and organizational environment many of these issues and 
subsequent recommendations are valid for the future of mobile security as well.  As 
discussed in the companion report on the UMTS testbed, even in these advanced mobile 
systems that will face greater security challenges as the number and decentralization of 
users of the Internet increases, security has been a victim of time-to-market pressures.  
Furthermore, it may be the case that the current network and organizational-level bias in 
discussions of security may not transfer well to the hyper-decentralized context of 
security management of millions of mobile users which will be faced by public mobile 
network operators.  
 
3. Public policy for mobile security 
 
Mechanisms for increasing mobile security may also include public policy, particularly 
given the network characteristics of the technology and the societal implications of an 
insecure telecommunications system. Development of such public policy mechanisms 
may fall in the realm of security organizations, where the security of mobile services 
would represent a special case.  Alternatively, such policies can be developed within 
organizations focused on the mobile sector, where the topic of security would represent a 
special case.  Here we focus on the latter approach. In this section we discuss the mobile 
telecommunications policy contexts and some recent policy developments in two 
important markets: Europe and the U.S.  
3.1 European mobile security policy context 
Public policy for mobile security in Europe will be developed in a dynamic context as the 
European Union has recently undertaken a far-reaching telecommunications policy 
reform.  These current changes have their roots in the extensive liberalization program of 
the 1990s, which reached its peak on January 1st, 1998, the deadline for implementation 
of full competition (including voice telephony) in the telecommunications markets2.  This 
legal basis for competition in addition to increasing Internet diffusion and convergence in 
the telecommunications, broadcasting and IT sectors, provided a foundation for 
developing a new view of the telecommunications sector. The new view aims to be 
technologically neutral such that services are treated similarly regardless of the medium 
used to deliver them and takes into account both infrastructure and associated services 3.   
 
In addition to these general aims, the new policy regime also sought to provide a variety 
of protections for users, including increasing transparency of information, particularly on 
consumer tariffs and required publication of quality of service information.  In the area of 
numbering, naming and addressing a primary goal was the extension of number 
portability to mobile users, while not requiring fixed-to-mobile portability.  Furthermore, 
the new policy regime aimed to establish a balance between application of sector-specific 
regulation versus competition rules by making greater use of the latter, and 
accomplishing these tasks through greater delegation of authority to the national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs)4,5.   
Given these goals, the Commission established the new regulatory framework that laid 
out sector-specific legislation to be used during the development of competitive markets.  
The sector-specific legislation included the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC), which 
provides general direction, and four specific directives on licensing (Authorization 
Directive 2002/20/EC), access and interconnection (Access Directive 2002/19/EC), 
universal service (Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC), and privacy and data 
protection (Directive on privacy and electronic communications 2002/58/EC). This 
                                                 
2 See Commission Directive 96/19 of 13 March 1996. 
3see http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24216.htm
4Most of the European NRAs are quite young.  Examples of beginning dates of operation include:  
OPTA (The Netherlands) August 1997; RegTP (Germany) January 1998; ART (France) January 
1997; Agcom (Italy) after July 1997. 
5 The possibility of a similar trend from sector-specific regulation to reliance on antitrust law in 
the U.S. is suggested by Shelanski (2002). 
represented a substantial simplification of the existing framework, reducing the number 
of legal measures from twenty to six6.  
These Directives provide merely a set of policy goals which are then interpreted and 
transposed into law at the national level.  Member States were able to reach agreement 
on, and thereby increasing the chances of harmonized national laws, the following mobile 
issues: 1. the continued use of sector specific regulation in parallel with competition 
policy; 2. the need to cover all communications infrastructure and associated services and 
that markets needed to be defined dynamically particularly when considering obligations 
for access and interconnection; 3. an update to the Data Protection Directive, particularly 
as regards telecommunications, was needed.  
Despite identifying a need for greater harmonization, the Member States did not agree on 
the following 6 mobile-related items.  There were differences of opinion on the possible 
funding of NRAs via license fees as well as methods for selling spectrum and the 
possibility of allowing secondary trading of spectrum.  There was also disagreement on a 
proposal to introduce two thresholds for asymmetric obligations in respect to access and 
interconnection (significant market power (SMP) and dominance) and whether or not 
number portability should be made available for mobile users.  Further differences were 
found concerning user facilities (such as caller location for emergency calls, per call tariff 
transparency) and quality of service, particularly NRA intervention on quality of service 
issues7.  
Given these points of disagreement it is expected that transposition into national laws will 
result in a variety of rules across the Member States.  However, even if full agreement 
were attained, differences in national legal systems would themselves create hurdles to a 
uniform implementation.  For example, in some Member States including Belgium, 
France and Spain it was proposed that the legislation be implemented through a 
comprehensive new communications law, while in the Netherlands and Denmark the 
approach is to amend current law.  Despite these differences mechanisms exist to 
facilitate harmonization of policies and procedures.  Two examples are the 
                                                 
6 The form of the legislation (i.e. Directives) has important consequences for the effects of these 
policies on the development of markets throughout the European Community.  At the EC’s 
formation five tools were developed that allow its institutions to impact on Member States’ 
national legal systems to varying degrees.  The five tools include regulations, directives, 
decisions, recommendations and opinions6. The directive is the most important legislative 
instrument alongside the regulation. Its purpose is to reconcile the dual objectives of both 
securing the necessary uniformity of Community law and respecting the diversity of national 
traditions and structures. Thus, the directive does not aim for unification of the law, which is the 
regulation's purpose, but instead its harmonization. The idea is to remove contradictions and 
conflicts between national laws and regulations or to gradually iron out inconsistencies so that, as 
far as possible, the same material conditions obtain in all the Member States. The directive is one 
of the primary means deployed in building the single market (Borchardt 1999). 
7 See COM(2000) 239 final, 26.04.2000, ‘Results of the public consultation on the 1999 
Communications Review and Orientations for the new Regulatory Framework.’  
Communications Committee and the European Regulators’ Group.  Through these 
organizations it is hoped a higher degree of uniformity in instruments and remedies for 
resolving market problems can be achieved8. 
 
It is within this general mobile telecommunication policy context that mobile security 
policies have developed. In July 2002 the Commission fulfilled its promise to update the 
telecommunications data protection directive. This Directive is concerned with the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in a more broadly defined 
electronic communications sector, which includes provisions for third party value-added 
service providers as well as providing direction for the handling of new types of data 
such as location-based data made possible by advanced mobile network technologies. 
The deadline for transposing this new Directive into national law is October 31, 2003.  
 
The Directive establishes the basis for holding both ‘electronic communication service’ 
providers as well as the providers of the ‘public communication network’ responsible 
(within limits) for network security, which is to be provided through both organizational 
and technological measures.  Furthermore, the document goes on to state that users must 
be notified of the risks of a security breach and where the providers choose not to insure 
against such risks the cost of doing so should also be provided.  
 
Given the recent nature of these policies it is yet to be seen how these policies will be 
transposed into national law and subsequently enforced.  Also at the national level many 
countries are adopting national security laws that may support or conflict with this 
telecommunications-specific version9.  A second related development occurs in the 
Directive itself but is concerned with privacy.  The Directive provides users with many 
rights concerning protection and management of their personal information.  Along that 
vein, the Directive encourages Member States, where required, to adopt measures to 
ensure that terminal equipment is constructed in a way that is compatible with the rights 
of users to protect and control the use of their personal data.  If such a measure was 
implemented to protect end-user’s security it would certainly have far-reaching 
consequences. 
3.2 U.S. mobile security policy context 
The U.S. mobile security policy context is also significantly influenced by regulatory 
changes of the 1990s.  The Communications Act of 1996 attempted to create a more 
vigorously competitive market in the mobile sector.  The degree to which this has 
happened is assessed annually in the FCC’s Annual Report on the state of competition in 
the Commercial Mobile Radio Services (CMRS) industry.  In its current report the 
Commission concludes that the market is competitive.  However, FCC Commissioner 
                                                 
8 See COM (2002) 695 final ‘The Eighth Report on the Implementation of the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Package.’  
9 See COM (2002) 695 final ‘The Eighth Report on the Implementation of the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Package.’ 
Copps noted this conclusion was reached despite a severe lack of reliable, objective data 
on mobile services.  Included in his call for more data he points out that quality of service 
statistics are lacking (Copps 2003a).  From a mobile telecommunications perspective, 
mobile security may become a quality of service issue. 
 
From a technical perspective the Commission is advised on mobile security issues from 
two bodies: the Technological Advisory Council (TAC) and the Network Reliability and 
Interoperability Council (NRIC).  TAC consists of 33 members chosen for their 
professional and technical expertise and provides the Commission with scientifically 
supportable information on emerging technologies.  The TAC addresses issues of 
network security, which it defines as issues related to the integrity, confidentiality of 
communications, and the technical enablers for the management of content rights.  NRIC 
is comprised of telecommunications industry leaders and provides a mechanism whereby 
these members can make recommendations concerning network reliability and 
interoperability to the FCC.  Its emphasis is on the public switched networks and it is 
currently concerned with developing measures and best practices for assessing 
reliability10.  
 
Although no recent policy developments appear to be directly related to end-user mobile 
security, several policies have been developed or are being considered that may have 
implications for end-user mobile security.  The policies are related to the e911 system, to 
the resale market for spectrum, and service rules for advanced wireless services. 
 
The e911 system for identifying the location of mobile callers to an emergency response 
center has been a focus of the mobile sector for a number of years.  Now that the legal 
basis for releasing caller location information has been established (and appropriate 
revenue streams to fund the system have been identified) the service providers are trying 
to establish the legal basis for release of information in less common scenarios, such as 
calls from third parties. Also caught up in this petition for rulemaking were scenarios 
whereby small mobile operators did not have around the clock service personnel to help 
emergency response agencies resolve problems such as prank calls.  In response to 
comments that the issues were beyond the jurisdiction of the FCC and the Department of 
Justice has been asked to become involved.  Thus, when this issue is resolved the reach of 
the FCC in resolving issues related to security, although not mobile-service related 
security, and the mobile sector will be more clearly defined11. 
 
The second policy development that may have indirect implications for mobile security is 
the Commission’s recent decision to allow a secondary market for spectrum. The 
                                                 
10See http://www.nric.org/   
11 See FCC RM-10715 Comment sought on petition for rulemaking on compliance by carriers 
with relevant statutory obligations on disclosure of customer information in 911 emergencies. 
June 16, 2003.  Also, the legality of the release of customer-specific information to Public Safety 
Answering Points (PSAPs) in the course of response to 911 emergency calls is treated in some 
way by amendments made to the Communications Act, the U.S. Criminal Code via the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 and the USA Patriot Act of 2001. 
Commission describes its Report and Order adopted May 15th, 2003, as a landmark step 
in their evolution toward greater reliance on market mechanisms in expanding the scope 
of wireless services. It establishes two mechanisms for leasing: ‘spectrum manager’ 
leasing and ‘de facto transfer’ leasing.  In the former the licensee must file notification 
with the Commission and the lessee is required to follow all technical and operational 
rules. However, the licensee would be required to maintain an enforcement role 
concerning issues related to Communications Act regulations and Commission rules, 
while for non-spectrum-related requirements directly related to offered services the lessee 
will be primarily responsible.  Thus, end-user security could be affected by both the level 
of compliance of the lessee and the degree of enforcement by the licensee.  In the ‘de 
facto transfer’ leasing arrangement prior approval by the Commission is required and the 
licensee’s responsibilities as enforcer are greatly reduced12. 
  
The effects of this Order are likely to be far reaching and may limit the Commission’s 
ability to deliver to end-users secure mobile networks and services.  As reflected in the 
dissenting comments of Commissioner Michael Copps, it is unclear how the Commission 
will be able to fulfill their responsibility of overseeing that spectrum be used in the public 
interest when use of that spectrum is transferred without application to the Commission 
(Copps 2003b).    
 
A third policy action that may have indirect effects on end-user mobile security is the 
Commission’s November 2002 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Service Rules for 
Advanced Wireless Services in the 1.7 and 2.1 GHz Bands (FCC 02-305; WT Docket 
Number 02-353).  In the NPRM they asked for comments on proposed standards for 
service or performance requirements.  The performance requirements suggested in the 
NPRM were limited to coverage obligations and distribution of coverage obligations if 
spectrum is split up.  Coverage obligations refer to requirements for providing services 
(without mention of quality standards for that service) to rural areas.  It will be interesting 
to see if in light of Commissioner Copps comments, if this action results in an order that 
provides more data to the Commission concerning quality of service.  Such an action 
could serve as the basis for collecting information about security-related performance of 
network operators. 
 
Thus, in the U.S. there are no apparent policy developments directly related to mobile 
security, while there are a number of initiatives that could have long run implications for 
end-user mobile security. This situation is contrasted with that in Europe where the 
Commission has taken action to insure that end-users are guaranteed secure mobile 
services.  However, it is yet to be seen how the Commission’s intentions are transferred 
to national policy.  As a last note it is also important to mention that in both Europe and 
the U.S. the approach to mobile security appears to be purely regional.  As indicated by 
developments in the area of fixed network security, there is a greater need for 
                                                 
12 See WT Docket No. 00-203 Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of 
Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets; Report and Order and Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking. 
international cooperation in this area (ITU 200k2).  At some point this approach must 
also be adopted for mobile networks as well.  
4. Research Agenda 
 
The review of issues and policy developments related end-user mobile security as well as 
our findings in the companion report “The Delft UMTS Testbed and End-user Security 
Features” raise a variety of questions.  These questions relate directly to end-user security 
as well as to factors shaping the supply and demand of secure mobile services.  The 
supply and demand of secure mobile services itself contains many issues including the 
relations among industry players and market mechanisms as well as policy mechanisms 
for affecting supply.   
4.1 End-user security 
How do end-users make use of the variety of PIN codes and passwords required to 
securely operate advanced mobile services? 
 
It is unclear how control over the number of passwords and PIN codes is controlled and if 
coordinated efforts to control the end-user security experience are being made.  Whether 
or not there is a coordinated effort, it is necessary to know what are the limits of end-user 
acceptance and management of these features.  The answer to this question would also 
provide insight to the practicality of Pethia’s (2003) suggestion that demand for secure 
technologies can be improved through education.   
 
Do private mobile users make use of security functions differently from organizational 
users? 
 
Many of the lessons from corporate/organizational fixed networks are being applied to 
corporate/organizational mobile networks.  However, it is unclear how far the lessons 
learned in this context can be applied to the general public.  Furthermore, given the dual 
use (business/private) of mobile phones, organizational security administrators need to be 
aware if such differences in behavior exist. 
4.2 Supply and Demand 
Industry relations and market mechanisms 
 
How does the instability in the UMTS standard affect the supply of secure hard and 
software as well as secure mobile services?  
 
Supplying security technologies will face many challenges including those related to the 
standard itself.  First, with the instability that results from different versions of the 
standard and different implementation notes resulting from change requests the decision 
of which version to implement is a challenge. This instability is compounded by the slow 
pace of development of the security features within the standard.  Given these constraints 
how do companies supply secure technologies?  
 
As in the desktop world, the security of mobile devices is likely to be highly dependent on 
the operating system.  What trends in terms of concentration and alliances are visible in 
the mobile operating system market and what are the effects of these trends on the supply 
of secure mobile services?  
 
Security is highly dependent on operating systems. As already mentioned as a finding 
from the testbed, the operating system is not transparent from the user perspective, while 
there are various mobile operating system providers. Currently, this is different from the 
PC market where Microsoft takes a dominant position.  
 
The choice of technologies made available to end-users in their handsets and through 
network services is the result of a complex set of choices made by a variety of market 
players.  How do the relationships between these players affect these choices and to what 
extent do they influence end-user security? 
 
Security is the result of choices made by and behaviors of handset- and network 
equipment manufacturers, operators and the end user. The project findings already 
indicated the close relationship between the operator and the network equipment 
manufacturer, the lack of control of operators on handset availability but also the 
operator’s control over the availability of certain security features. So it is interesting to 
research the influence of these relationships on resulting security features.  The answer to 
this question should provide insight into the practicality of security policies that make the 
service provider or network operator responsible for the security of services.  
 
Policy mechanisms 
 
In the U.S. is there a legal basis for requiring certain security quality of service 
standards be provided by network operators or third party service providers? 
 
Intervention by policy makers in the telecommunications industry are often justified by 
market concentration.  However, in the mobile sector the Commission has deemed the 
market to be competitive which implies that the level of security of services be 
determined by the market.  However, new policies, namely those concerned with 
Homeland Security, may provide a justification for interventions that will guarantee end-
users secure services. 
 
If so, will the secondary market enhance, degenerate or have no effect on security of 
service? 
 
As suggested by Commissioner Copps, the Commission may have reduced its ability to 
insure that spectrum be used in the public interest through the establishment of a 
secondary market.  An analysis of the incentives that licensees face for reporting 
violations would provide insights as to the extent to which the Commission’s ability has 
been reduced. 
 
How will the policy concerning mobile security adopted by the European Commission be 
transposed into national law?  How will the national laws vary? What mechanisms are in 
place to enforce such a policy? 
 
The European Commission by its nature is not tied to the political forces of a nation and 
as such may be at greater liberty to pass legislation that will face problems at the national 
level.  The extent to which Member States are willing and able to implement policies 
holding network and service providers accountable for secure service will shed light on 
the future of secure services and the role of the parties involved. 
5. Conclusions 
The research agenda presented above is derived from consideration of both the market 
and policy factors affecting the supply and demand of secure mobile services as well as 
the experience gained from involvement in a UMTS testbed in The Netherlands.  While 
the latter exposed us to the realities of implementing a new network technologies and the 
challenges that are posed by security features the consideration of supply, demand and 
policy issues provides a broader picture of the future of mobile end-user security. 
 
The result of this synthesis is the realization of the great deal of work to be done in this 
area.   The research agenda proposed above spans from the user-behavior level to that of 
international telecommunications policy.  Despite the broad range of issues covered each 
item comes back to the fundamental issue of the unique perspective of end-user security.  
The end-user perspective of security differs from network or system-level perspectives.  
It inherently combines what is technically feasible with the behavior of real users.  This 
last piece is very important in this context as secure systems are vulnerable to their 
weakest link and thus end-user perspectives on security will in total play a large role in 
overall system security. 
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